Showing posts with label Conveyance and Recording Issues. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Conveyance and Recording Issues. Show all posts

Ohio’s New Notary Law Definitely Worth Noting


By: Stephen D. Richman, Esq., Senior Counsel-Kohrman, Jackson & Krantz
Effective last Friday, September 20, 2019, a new law (Ohio Senate Bill 263, the Notary Public Modernization Act) went into effect which makes significant changes for Ohio Notaries Public and those who wish to become Notaries. While some may not assign preeminent importance to “notary law”, the Ohio State Bar Association adds notable perspective by stating, “the bill ensures consistent standards across the state and provides for the training and support they need to confidently and accurately witness and authenticate all the affidavits and oaths, property titles, grants, deeds, contracts, adoptions, advanced directives and powers of attorney — the documents, which represent the most important transactions in our lives and for our economy.”  
Key provisions of SB 263 include the following changes to Ohio Notary law:
1.      Who is in Charge? The Ohio Secretary of State’s office is now in charge and the place to go for anyone applying for a new Notary commission or seeking to renew their commission. Previously, Ohio’s county courts of common pleas governed the process. 
2.      Non-attorney applicants for new Ohio Notary commissions will be required to obtain a criminal records check, complete a three hour education program and take/pass a test. Those seeking to renew will need a new (not more than six months old) criminal records check and need to complete a one hour “refresher” educational program.

3.      New attorney applicants will be required to complete a three hour training program, but will not be required to obtain a criminal records check or take a test.

4.       New Fees. Ohio Notaries may now charge up to: (i) $5 for an in-person, paper notarization; (ii) $10 for electronic notarizations that are not performed online; and (iii) $25 for a remote, online notarization.

5.      “New” Forms/Rules.

a)      Jurats. (where one swears to or affirms the truthfulness of the contents of a document). For jurats, the new law includes a new statutory jurat form; or, you can still draft your own, provided, however that it clearly states that an oath or affirmation was administered.

b)      Acknowledgements. (verify the identity of the signer and confirm that the signer signed a document). For acknowledgements, you can use the “statutory short forms of acknowledgment” in the existing statute, or, you can create your own, but the new law requires that the acknowledgement: 1) contain the words “acknowledged before me” or their substantial equivalent; and 2) clearly state that an oath or affirmation was not administered.

6.      Online Notaries. Anyone who is a commissioned Ohio Notary may apply to be an online Notary. To become authorized you must: 1) Successfully complete a two hour education program; 2) pass a test; 3) pay an authorized provider a fee of $250; and 4) submit an application to the Secretary of State and pay an application fee of $20.

The Ohio Society of Notaries (http://ohionotaries.org/) has been approved by the Secretary of State as an Authorized Provider of Training & Testing under the new law. To find out more about their training offerings, or to get answers to your questions about notary procedures, signing situations, or best practices; you can call their free helplines at (614) 336-7878, (614) 348-3305, or Email them.




Bragdon v. Carter- Life Estate or Unreasonable Restraint on Alienation

By: Stephen D. Richman, Esq. - Senior Counsel- Kohrman, Jackson & Krantz
(A Watch Your Language Series Article)

 As is commonly known, ignorance of the law is no excuse to one who is charged with a crime.

In real estate, however, while ignorance of the law will rarely result in a prison term, it will almost always result in unintended consequences that could have easily been avoided by hiring (at the outset) qualified, legal professionals whose job is to know the law and know it well.

The defendants in the recent case of Bragdon v. Carter, 2017-Ohio-8257 (4th Appellate District) found this out the hard way.

The facts of the case are as follows:

Burl Bragdon, an individual from Scioto County died testate in 1998, and owned a tract of real estate at the time of his death. Bragdon’s will provided in pertinent part: “ITEM IV: I give, bequeath and devise my real estate equally to my children and friend, BELINDA DILES, BRENDA BRAGDON, BURL BRAGDON II, and BETH A NIXON, per stirpes, provided that said real estate not be sold until twenty-one (21) years after the death of my granddaughter, MORGAN MCKENZIE DILES, born April 14, 1996. It is the purpose of this bequest that my children and their heirs shall always have a place to live.”

The executrix, Belinda Diles Carter admitted the will to probate, and thereafter, a certificate of transfer was issued, conveying a one-fourth interest in the real estate to Burl Bragdon’s three children and his friend, as directed under the will. The certificate of transfer noted the following: “Said real estate may not be sold until twenty-one (21) years after the death of Morgan McKenzie Diles.”

While, apparently, Burl Bragdon wanted the property to be a continual homestead for his children and grandchild, the family had other plans. After a series of transfers by the children named in the will, 100% of the interests in the property were held by Corey and Heather Bragdon (who were not named in the will, and whose relation is not explained in the decision) who wanted to then transfer the property outside of the family, without being subject to the restriction against transfer. Accordingly, Corey and Heather Bragdon (plaintiffs/appellants) filed a complaint with the trial court for a declaration that the plaintiffs hold valid title, without the restriction (which plaintiffs claimed was invalid).

Basically, the trial court in Bragdon v. Carter was faced with deciding whether or not the property could be lawfully sold, in light of the restriction in the will and certificate of transfer. On January 23, 2017, the trial court entered judgment in favor of the defendants. In its judgment entry, the trial court found that the restriction on alienation was valid and that the transfer of the property was a clear violation of Burl Bragdon’s wishes, was contrary to Ohio law, and would unfairly and unjustly divest Morgan McKenzie Diles of her future interest in the property. Heather and Corey Bragdon then filed a notice of appeal.

The appellants in Bragdon v. Carter claimed that the trial court erred (made a mistake) as a matter of law in finding the transfer restriction valid. They claimed that Ohio has adopted, from our English common-law heritage, what is known as the “rule against unreasonable restraints on alienation.”  This general rule provides that since one of the main incidents of ownership of real property is the right to convey it, the law will not allow the rights of ownership to be limited by imposing restraints by those who seek to convey or dispose of their property, and at the same time maintain control over its alienation or use. This rule stems from the abolishment of the feudal “fee tail” which restricted the transfer of real property to a specific line of male heirs.  Our “modern law” frowns upon such restraints since they stifle the free use and development of real property, and consequently, are not in the best interest of society and commerce.

The appellee’s argument (and apparently, the basis of the trial court’s decision) was that only a valid “life estate” was transferred, not a transfer of fee simple absolute title, subject to a restriction against lifetime transfers.  

To get a better grasp of the issue faced by the court of appeals in in Bragdon v. Carter, a brief “Real Estate Law 101” lesson on estates (interests) in land is warranted. As a general rule, real property ownership is more like the possession of a bundle of rights (vs. merely the possession of dirt and improvements on the dirt).  The basic rights included in such “bundle” are the right to use, the right to sell, the right to mortgage, the right to lease, the right to give away, and right to enter (or the right to refuse to exercise any of these rights). The fullest possible title to real estate (the biggest bundle of rights) is called "fee simple absolute". Examples of lesser estates are leases (right to use, but no right to sell), easements and life estates. Life estates are estates in land where parties measure ownership by the life of the life estate holder. The life estate terminates on the death of the life estate holder, and then the property passes to a future, named owner (known generally as the “remainderman” or the “remainder holder”). While the owner of a life estate can sell its interest, the buyer would be limited to enjoy/use the property until the death of the life estate holder or “life tenant”, at which time all of the rights of ownership would belong to/pass to the reminder holder.

The court of appeals in in Bragdon v. Carter agreed with the appellee’s general conclusion that if a valid life estate (with a remainder interest to the granddaughter) was created, the trial court’s approval of the transfers and declaration of ownership to plaintiff-appellants would unfairly and unjustly divest Morgan McKenzie Diles of her future interest in the property. In reversing the trial court’s finding for defendant-appellees’ however, the court of appeals determined that there was no clear indication that a life estate was intended. Citing precedent to support its holding, the court stated that “[a] devise or bequest of a life estate must be clearly expressed to be effective. “ Analyzing the documents provided, the court found no mention of the term “life estate”, no designation of the granddaughter as the remainder holder, and no other indication of intent to have created a life estate. Moreover, the court cited statutory authority directing the court to not establish a lesser estate without a clear expression of the creation of the same. Pursuant to Ohio Revised Code Section 2107.51, “every devise of an interest in real property in a will shall convey all the estate of the devisor in the property, unless it clearly appears by the will that the devisor intended to convey a less estate.”

In sum, the court of appeals in Bragdon v. Carter concluded that “the real property at issue was transferred in fee simple absolute, and the portion of the devise attempting to restrict the alienability of the property is void and of no effect as being repugnant to the devise and the public policy of this State. Thus, the trial court erred in determining that the restriction was valid.” Based on the foregoing, the court reversed the judgment of the trial court and remanded the cause to that court to enter judgment in favor of plaintiff-appellants Corey and Heather Bragdon.

What is the moral of this story?

Simply, to win at the “game of real estate law”, you have to know the rules. It is against the rules to restrict fee simple absolute transfers of real estate to certain people for certain periods of time. It is absolutely fine, however, to transfer lesser estates such as leases or life estates. Carrying our analogy further to a game of football, a forward pass and a forward lateral both move the ball forward. However, a forward lateral moves the ball forward in such a way that it is against the rules. Lawyers are trained to know the rules, and should always be used in the game of real estate. Penalties in terms of legal fees and unintended consequences are much harder to swallow than the loss of a down, yardage or the outcome of a football game.


Another moral of this story is the following, common thread in many Ohio real estate decisions (and articles re: same in this Blog): Watch your language, and say what you mean, precisely, or a judge will decide what you meant.” I presume that the use of the following four words in Mr. Bragdon’s will and certificate of transfer would have changed the outcome of this decision and the “law of unintended consequences”: “life estate” and “remainder interest.”

Happy New – Real Estate Laws- Year


By: Stephen D. Richman, Senior Counsel- Kohrman, Jackson & Krantz


As you may know, Ohio Governor John Kasich and the Ohio Legislature have been very busy passing laws and putting same into effect at the end of 2016 and the beginning of this year. Among the twenty-eight bills signed by Governor Kasich on January 4th are two real estate related statutes worth noting: 1) Am. Sub. SB 257 (regarding the validity of recorded real property instruments); and 2) Am. H. B. 532 which revises the Ohio Revised Code (“O.R.C.”) relating to real estate brokers and salespersons.

I.                   Am. Sub. SB 257

A.                What does this bill do? Am. Sub. SB 257 first amends O.R.C. Section 5301.07 (B) by establishing two rebuttable presumptions regarding deeds, mortgages, installment contracts, leases, memorandums of trust, powers of attorney, and other instruments accepted by the county for recording. Namely, that 1) the recorded instrument conveys, encumbers, or is enforceable against the interest of the person who signed the instrument and; 2) that the instrument is valid, enforceable, and effective as if the instrument were legally made, executed, acknowledged, and recorded, without any defects. These presumptions can only be rebutted by clear and convincing evidence of fraud, undue influence, duress, forgery, incompetency, or incapacity, and must be rebutted, if at all within four (4) years of recording the defective instrument (See revised O.R.C. Section 5301.07 (C)). The prior version of Sec. 5301.07 (C) allowed a challenger twenty-one (21) years to rebut the validity of a defective instrument. S.B. 257 also provides that the filing of an instrument, albeit defective, is constructive notice to all third parties of the validity of the instrument notwithstanding a defect in the making, execution, or acknowledgment of the instrument (See revised O.R.C. Section 5301.07 (C)). In other words, pursuant to amended Section 5301.07 of the Ohio Revised Code, a recorded instrument is presumed valid when recorded, and deemed valid four years afterwards.

Am. Sub. SB 257 also amends O.R.C. Sec. 5301.07 (C) such that the specific defects enumerated in the statute (instrument not witnessed, not acknowledged [or defectively acknowledged]) and person holding property interest not identified in the granting clause) are now examples of the type of defect covered by the statute vs. the only defects covered.

Finally, Am. Sub. SB 257 amends various sections of Ohio Revised Code Section 5709 to “establish a procedure by which political subdivisions proposing a tax increment financing (TIF) incentive district must notify affected property owners and permit them to exclude their property.”

B.                 When does it become law? Am. Sub. SB 257 was signed by Governor Kasich on January 4, 2017 and becomes effective ninety (90) days thereafter.

C.                 Why is it significant? Basically, deeds and other instruments that would otherwise need to be re-signed or re-recorded to correct defects will automatically be cured by operation of law (by virtue of the language in the revised statute). For example, let’s say you are applying for a loan and the title report shows the deed you received was signed by an individual who forgot to add “Jr.” at the end of his name. You should now be able to convince the bank that the deed does not have to be corrected and re-recorded, as a condition to your loan. Additionally, title companies should now be more willing to remove defectively made/signed/acknowledged instruments from their lists of title exceptions in title commitments.  

Even if banks and title companies don’t rush to relax their practices in accord with this statute, the statutory presumptions and deemed validities inherent in Am. Sub. SB 257 should reduce the risks inherent in completing transactions in spite of these types of title “defects”. This is especially true with regard to defective oil and gas leases which are typically excluded from title insurance coverage.

II.                Am. HB 532

A.                What does this bill do? Am. HB 532 incorporates recommendations stemming from a 2012 special task force created by the Ohio Real Estate Commission including: defining/ categorizing brokers (as “Associate Brokers” or “Principal Brokers”), consolidating the duties of a Principal Broker in one new Ohio Revised Code section (Sec. 4735.081 (C)), allowing a broker to be a Principal Broker at more than one company, allowing prospective licensees the option of completing their pre-licensing education in the classroom or on-line, and increasing post-licensing education requirements.

Re: the “New Broker Categories”- Pursuant to new Section 4735.01 (AA) and (GG) of the Ohio Revised Code, respectively, "Associate Broker" means an “individual licensed as a real estate broker under this chapter [4735] who does not function as the principal broker or a management level licensee”; and "Principal Broker" means an “individual licensed as a real estate broker under this chapter [4735] who oversees and directs the operations of the brokerage.” Pursuant to O.R.C. Section 4735.081 (A), “each brokerage is to designate at least one affiliated broker to act as the principal broker of the brokerage and any affiliated broker not so designated is to be considered an associate broker or management level licensee for that brokerage.” "Management level licensee" means a “licensee who is employed by or affiliated with a real estate broker and who has supervisory responsibility over other licensees employed by or affiliated with that real estate broker.” The supervisory responsibilities are not new, but are packaged nicely in an easy to read format in O.R.C. Sec. 4735.081 (C). Such responsibilities include: overseeing and directing the operations of the brokerage including the licensed activity of affiliated licensees, renewing and maintaining licenses and generating and maintaining company policies (and practices and procedures) and transactional records. The principal broker or brokers of a brokerage may assign to a management level licensee any of the afore-mentioned duties.

Re: Licensing Education- According to Am. HB 532, prospective licensees may now complete the required 120 hours of pre-licensing education “by either classroom instruction or distance education.”  O.R.C. Section 4735.01 (DD) defines “distance education” as instruction “accomplished through use of interactive, electronic media and where the teacher and student are separated by distance or time, or both.” Currently, only brokers have the option of on-line licensing.  All pre-licensing course work must still be taken by an accredited, public or private “Institution of Higher Learning.”

Am. HB 532 also increased from ten (10) to twenty (20) hours the post licensure educational requirements.

B.                 When does it become law? Am. HB 532 was signed by Governor Kasich on January 4, 2017 and becomes effective ninety (90) days thereafter.

C.                 Why is it significant? According to the bill’s sponsor, the new categories of “broker” were created to: 1) better reflect the way brokerage organizations operate; and 2) to hold those who engage in supervisory functions (i.e. Principal Brokers) accountable, while removing such accountability from brokers who do not have oversight responsibility.

Apart from limited opposition, the licensure modifications have been heralded as simply modernizing real estate education. Supporters of the legislation (including the Ohio Board of Realtors) assert that real estate courses and the profession in general can now be made more accessible to those previously hindered by geographic limitations, those looking to real estate as a second career and those who have difficulty learning in a classroom setting.











There’s a New Form in Town (for Cuyahoga County Real Estate Transfers)

By: Stephen D. Richman, Esq., Senior Counsel at Kohrman, Jackson & Krantz

Actually, effective August 1, 2016, for Cuyahoga County, there is a new Page 2 to the statewide Real Property Conveyance Fee Statement of Value and Receipt (Form DTE 100). Form DTE 100 is the form that must accompany all real estate transfers in Ohio (unless exempt from conveyance fees pursuant to Ohio Revised Code Section 319.54 (G)(3)). Entitled the “Sales Verification Questionnaire”, this form must be signed and completed by either the seller or the buyer.  The Conveyance Fee Statement (the first page of Form DTE 100 is required to be completed/signed by the grantee or a representative of the grantee). By signing this questionnaire, the party completing same must acknowledge “that the information provided to the Cuyahoga County Fiscal Office regarding [the] real estate transfer is truthful and completed to the best of their knowledge.”

The newly revised Form DTE 100 can be obtained at the following site:

Basically, the Sales Verification Questionnaire (aka “new Page 2 of Form DTE 100) asks the following questions, extracted from the form:

1. Were there any special conditions affecting the sale?
O Sale between family members.
O Sale between two affiliated businesses.
O Auction Sale
O Forced Sale or Sheriff's Sale
O Sale involved a government agency or public utility.
O Buyer is a religious or charitable organization.
O Land contract or contract for deed.
O Sale involves only a partial interest.
O Sale includes trade or exchange of properties.
O Sale by judicial order
O NONE OF THE ABOVE


2. What was the use of the property at time of sale?
O Single Family Residence O Vacant Lot O Multifamily Residence O Retail O Apartment Building                                               O Industrial  O Other

3. Was property rented/leased at time of sale? O Yes O No

4. Did sale price include an existing business? O Yes O No

5. Was any personal property, such as furniture, equipment, machinery, livestock,
business inventory, included in the sale price? O Yes O No

If yes, describe:

Est. Value of Personal Prop. Incl. in Sale: $

6. Have there been any recent changes to the property?
 O No O Demolition
 O Addition(s) O Renovations

When was work completed?
Estimated Cost of Work Done: $

7. Does the buyer hold title to any adjoining property? O Yes O No

8. Was an appraisal done on the property? O Yes O No

9. Were any delinquent taxes assumed by the purchaser?
O No
O Yes – Amount: __________

10. How was the property marketed? (Check all that apply)
O Listed with Real Estate Agent O Displayed "For Sale" sign
O Advertised in Newspaper O Word of Mouth
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Why the need for this new form? The form itself answers this question; “All information obtained through this questionnaire will be used to determine whether or not this transaction is an arm’s-length, market based sale.”

What is an arm’s-length sale? In Ohio, relevant case law has established that “three factors are relevant to deciding whether a transaction occurred at arm’s-length: whether the sale was voluntary; i.e., without compulsion or duress, whether the sale [took] place in an open market, and whether the buyer and seller act[ed] in their own self-interest.”

Why does it matter if your transaction is an arm’s-length, market based sale? Basically, it has to do with establishing the value of real property which in turn determines the amount of real estate taxes required to be paid. The general rule with regard to determining value of real property (in order to calculate real estate taxes) is that the purchase price at a recent (within three years) arm’s-length sale of the property between a willing buyer and willing seller is usually dispositive. (Note that “usually” is italicized above because pursuant to Ohio Am. Sub H.B. 487 (H.B. 487) signed into law on June 11, 2012, the revised statutory language of R.C. 5713.03 now provides that an auditor may (vs. shall consider the price of a recent sale as value). Nevertheless, auditors usually consider the price of a recent, arm’s-length sale as value because what better indication of value is there than the price someone is willing to pay and actually pays for the property?

If not arm’s-length, however, auditors will usually not establish value based on the price. Examples of non-arm’s-length sales are: sales between family members, sale between two affiliated businesses, auction sales and other sales of the types described on the new Sale Verification Questionnaire.

Is this new questionnaire good or bad for taxpayers? While most of the information called for on the new form seems likely to result in increased valuations for the taxpayer, answers to questions 4 and 5 might help prove that valuation (and accordingly taxes) should be lowered.  

For example, if the purchase price of a $500,000 commercial property includes personal property valued at $100,000, the valuation of the real property should be $400,000. In such a case, however, consistency is the key. Appraisals are recommended to establish the value of significant personal property purchased along with real property, purchase agreements should specifically allocate the purchase price between real and personal property, and Section 7 (d)-(f) of the Real Property Conveyance Fee Statement (page one of Form DTE 100) should appropriately provide separate values for personal and real property, based upon the appraisal and agreed allocation.

Will the Sales Verification Questionnaire be required in other counties in Ohio? Good question. Counties researched thus far have not followed suit, but are expected to. I have posed this question to the Ohio Department of Taxation, and will supplement this article upon receipt of their answer.


Oil and Gas Leases Are Title Transactions Under Ohio Dormant Mineral Act

By Kathleen Maloney - Courtesy of CourtNewsOhio.gov

A lease that grants oil and gas rights to another party and was recorded with the county recorder is a title transaction under the state’s Dormant Mineral Act, the Ohio Supreme Court ruled today. However, the Court concluded, the unrecorded expiration of an oil and gas lease does not qualify as a title transaction.

In mineral-rich areas, such as Marcellus and Utica Shale regions of eastern Ohio, rights to the surface property and the minerals below are often owned separately. However, the mineral interests can be considered abandoned if 20 years pass without a title transaction or the occurrence of another event described in the statute.

The Court’s decision, written by Chief Justice Maureen O’Connor, was unanimous in ruling that the unrecorded expiration of an oil and gas lease is not a title transaction. The Court divided, though, on whether the leases themselves are title transactions – with one justice concurring in the judgment but not the reasoning, and two justices dissenting.

The holding answers questions submitted by a federal court considering a dispute between the owners of 90-plus acres in Harrison County and the various companies that have leased the property’s mineral interests. The case now returns to the federal court for additional proceedings.

Land and Mineral Rights Changed Multiple Times
A mining company split the surface and mineral rights on this Harrison County land in 1958. Clarence and Anna Bell Sedoris became owners of the land, while the mining company kept the oil and gas interests.

Throughout the years, the surface property and mineral rights changed hands many times. The landowners now are Dennis Elias, Jeffrey and Janice Elias, and Arieh and Sunni Ordronneau. (Kenneth Buell was dismissed from the case.) North American Coal Royalty Company owns the mineral rights, and multiple companies, including Chesapeake Exploration, lease parts of those rights.

In October 2012, some of the lessees of the oil and gas rights sued the property owners, Coal Royalty, and one of the other lessees in federal court to “quiet” any claims to those resources. Eventually, Coal Royalty and all the mineral rights’ lessees were realigned on one side as the plaintiffs in this case.

Elements of State Law
Ohio’s Dormant Mineral Act, R.C. 5301.56, is part of the Marketable Title Act and creates a method to rejoin a surface property with abandoned mineral interests. The act’s purpose is “to clear title and promote the use of the mineral rights for development and production,” today’s Supreme Court opinion noted. The original act became law in 1989 and was amended in 2006.

Chief Justice O’Connor explained that while the parties disagree about which version of the law applies in this case, that question was not one submitted by the federal court for review. The questions before the Court involved the meaning of “title transaction,” and the analysis of the issues was the same under either version of the law.

Oil and Gas Leases Are Title Transactions
The first question was whether an oil and gas lease is a title transaction within the meaning of the state law. Severed minerals interests can be considered abandoned and return to the surface property owner unless an event that saves the mineral interests occurs in a 20-year window.

The law lists six possible “saving events,” including situations in which the mineral interests have been subject to a title transaction that has been filed or recorded with the appropriate county recorder.

The Marketable Title Act, which includes the Dormant Mineral Act, defines a “title transaction” as “any transaction affecting title to any interest in land, including title by will or descent, title by tax deed, or by trustee’s, assignee’s, guardian’s, executor’s, administrator’s, or sheriff’s deed, or decree of any court, as well as warranty deed, quit claim deed, or mortgage.”

Because the law uses the words “any” and “including,” the meaning of “title transaction” is not limited to only those examples listed, the chief justice reasoned. The justices dissenting on this issue would limit the definition to transactions that “alter who owns the property at issue.” However, the Court’s majority concluded that “is an overly restrictive reading of the statutory definition.”

“We find that by [the terms of this lease] or substantially similar terms, the mineral interest has been the subject of a title transaction because the oil and gas lease affects title to the surface and mineral interests in land in a number of ways,” Chief Justice O’Connor explained. “As discussed above, a ‘title transaction’ as defined in R.C. 5301.47(F) is not limited to a transaction that alters an ownership interest. Transactions creating interests like easements or use restrictions are also title transactions. This is consistent with the meaning of the word ‘title,’ which, as a concept rather than a legal instrument, is defined as ‘[t]he union of all elements (as ownership, possession, and custody) constituting the legal right to control and dispose of property.’”

“The lease in this case grants the lessee an unequivocal and exclusive right to the mineral estate for a fixed term plus an indefinite extended term upon the happening of certain conditions, such as actual production of oil and gas or a prescribed payment to the lessor,” she continued. “Based on the vested nature of this grant, the oil and gas lease has been construed as transferring to the lessee a fee simple determinable in the mineral estate with a reversionary interest retained by the lessor that can be triggered by events or conditions specified in the lease. … Even if the lessor conveys title to the surface or mineral estates during the lifetime of the lease to a third party, the lease is binding on those successors and is therefore an encumbrance that remains with the realty.”

“Additionally, a recorded lease in the chain of title notifies all others with a potential interest in the surface or the mineral estate that the land is encumbered. An oil and gas company searching land records for potential leasable mineral estates would find an estate already encumbered by a lease. In this way, the lease resembles more of an encumbrance than an easement or a mortgage. The lease forecloses the ability of the lessor or any third party to freely access the property for exploration, development, and extraction of mineral resources.”

Expiration of Oil and Gas Lease, Though, Is Not Title Transaction
On the federal court’s second question, the Court concluded that a lease’s expiration that is not recorded does not qualify as a title transaction affecting the 20-year window.

“[T]he terms of a recorded oil and gas lease cannot provide sufficient notice of activity under the lease to toll the 20-year clock during the life of the lease, nor can the expiration of such a lease be considered a ‘title transaction that has been recorded or filed’ within the meaning of R.C. 5301.56(B)(3)(a) when the expiration is unrecorded,” the chief justice wrote. “Accordingly, we conclude that the unrecorded expiration of an oil and gas lease does not constitute a saving event under R.C. 5301.56(B)(3)(a) that would restart the 20-year clock.”

Votes
Joining the chief justice’s opinion were Justices Judith Ann Lanzinger, Judith L. French, and William O’Neill.

Justice Sharon L. Kennedy concurred with the Court’s answers to the federal court’s questions and with the legal reasoning related to the lease expiration issue. However, she disagreed with the Court’s analysis of the first question regarding the meaning of “title transaction.”

Justice Paul E. Pfeifer concurred in part and dissented in part in an opinion joined by Justice Terrence O’Donnell.

Justice Presents Different Reasons Why Leases Are Title Transactions
While Justice Kennedy agreed that a recorded oil and gas lease is a title transaction, she disagreed with the majority’s analysis on the issue.

She first noted that contrary to Justice Pfeifer’s dissent, the General Assembly’s replacement of the language “conveyed, leased, transferred, or mortgaged” in R.C. 5301.56 with the more general term “title transaction” indicated an attempt to broaden, rather than narrow, the types of transactions that qualify as a saving event.

In her view, however, the Court’s majority did not need to address whether oil and gas leases create a specific property interest. Instead, the answer could be determined by reviewing the relevant statutes alone. She examined the Marketable Title Act and also the related laws requiring that certain documents be recorded.

“Harmonizing the provisions of the [Marketable Title Act] with the recording statutes contained in R.C. Chapters 2113, 5301, and 5309 reveals a commonality with the examples of title transactions listed in R.C. 5301.47(F),” she wrote. “The examples are claims or interests against, or in, land that must be recorded pursuant to the Revised Code. Therefore, construing the recording statutes and R.C. 5301.47(F) in pari materia, I would hold that any transaction that must be recorded must be a ‘title transaction’ within R.C. 5301.47(F) because the purpose of a recording requirement is to ‘provide a public record of transactions affecting title to land.’”

Two Justices Conclude Leases Are Not Title Transactions
Justice Pfeifer concurs with the Court’s opinion on the lease expiration issue. However, he concluded that a recorded oil and gas lease is not a title transaction. He emphasized that the “title transaction” definition does not include anything similar to a lease.

“Granted, R.C. 5301.47(F) does not state that its list of transactions that affect title is exhaustive, but every transaction mentioned in the statute either actually or potentially affects an ownership interest in the property,” he wrote. “Since all of the examples listed in R.C. 5301.47(F) bear on the ownership of property, it follows that a transaction like a lease, which does not alter who owns the property at issue, falls outside the scope of the statute.”

He added that the initial Dormant Mineral Act legislation included the lease of a property as a saving event, but that language was removed before the bill was enacted.

“This is not to say that leases have no role in the [Dormant Mineral Act],” he wrote. “A saving event occurs when ‘[t]here has been actual production or withdrawal of minerals by the holder … from lands covered by a lease to which the mineral interest is subject ….’ Simply put, a lease plays a part in a saving event when production begins pursuant to the lease’s terms, but not while the minerals to which it is attached remain unexploited.”

A recorded lease does not affect the owner’s title to the property and therefore is not a title transaction, Justice Pfeifer concluded.

2014-0067. Chesapeake Exploration, L.L.C. v. Buell, Slip Opinion No. 2015-Ohio-4551.


Please note: Opinion summaries are prepared by the Office of Public Information for the general public and news media. Opinion summaries are not prepared for every opinion, but only for noteworthy cases. Opinion summaries are not to be considered as official headnotes or syllabi of court opinions. The full text of this and other court opinions are available online.


Watch Your Language with Restrictive Covenants

(“Say what you mean, precisely, or a judge will decide what you meant” #8)



As established in other “Watch Your Language” articles for this Blog, as a general rule, courts will uphold language in commercial agreements, unless it is contrary to statutory law or public policy. Because of this judicial deference to “commercial language”, you must say what you mean, precisely, or a judge will decide what you meant. Saying what you mean, precisely, is even more important in the context of negative covenants that limit the uses that can be made by the owner or occupier of land (aka restrictive covenants).

Why? Because it is well-established that restrictive covenants on the use of property are generally viewed with disfavor in Ohio courts and in other jurisdictions. The free use of land and property rights has occupied an important part of our history, and is rooted in the Constitution. Nonetheless, courts still enforce restrictions when they are clearly and unambiguously used in covenants (unless contrary to law or public policy).  Certainly, restrictive covenants constituting unlawful discrimination in Ohio (and elsewhere) are held to be void (See ORC Section 5309.281) and restrictions on the type of use (e.g. residential, commercial…) are usually upheld. It is between these two extremes where it gets difficult to predict. As a guide, there are five criteria used by courts in Ohio to assist them in analyzing whether an enforceable restriction has been created by a covenant.

First, the restrictions “must be a part of the general subdivision plan and applicable to all lots.” Second, “lot purchasers must be given adequate notice of the restriction.” Third, the restrictions must be in accord with law and public policy. Fourth, the restriction “cannot be implied, but must be express.” Finally, the restriction must “run with the land and, as a result, be inserted in the form of a covenant in the owner’s chain of title.”

What about an amendment to existing restrictions which amendment prevents a landowner from using the property for the purposes for which it was originally purchased? This was the issue before the court in Grace Fellowship Church, Inc. v. Harned, 2013-Ohio-5852(11th Dist. Ct. of App., Trumbull Cty.).


The basic facts of the case are as follows: In 1989, owners of a tract of land recorded “Restrictions Covering All Lots and Parcels of Land in the Meadows Plat, Vienna Township.” These 1989 restrictive covenants established required set-back lines, size of dwellings, construction restrictions, and limitations on items that may be placed or parked on the land. The 1989 restrictions also contained the following language re: effective dates and modification procedures: “The covenants herein shall be construed as covenants running with the land, and shall remain in effect until January 1, 1999, and thereafter, unless and except modified or changed by a vote of 51% or more, of the lot or acreage owners…” In March of 2011, Grace Fellowship purchased land located at Lot 13 in the Meadows Plat. Grace Fellowship also purchased 70 acres of land adjacent to the Meadows Plat. 

Grace Fellowship intended to build a church on the newly purchased land and to construct a driveway or access road upon Lot 13. Grace Fellowship’s plans did not violate the 1989 restrictive covenants. In December of 2011, a majority of the owners in the Meadows Plat signed a document attempting to amend the 1989 restrictive covenants. The amendment created additional restrictions on the usage of the property in the Meadows Plat, providing that: “All lots or acreage contained in the original Meadows Plat shall be used solely for single family residential purposes. No lot or acreage contained therein shall be used for or contain a road, highway, alleyway, driveway, passageway, thoroughfare, avenue, street, route, parkway, byway, trail, lane, path, or parking lot…” By virtue of the 2011 Amendment, Grace Fellowship would not be able to use Lot 13 for a road, and accordingly, it would not be able to operate its church on the adjoining 70 acres. In 2012, Grace Fellowship filed a Complaint for Declaratory Judgment and Other Relief against the owners of the lots located in the Meadows Plat. Grace Fellowship argued that the restrictive covenants had expired on January 1, 1999, and that the 2011 amendment violated Ohio’s Marketable Title Act because it allowed an increased burden to the property upon the amendment of the restrictive covenants. It also argued that the amendment violated its religious freedom, disallowed the church to have ingress and egress across the property, and that a proper vote was not held to modify the covenants.

The Meadows Plat landowners argued that the 1989 covenants had not expired; the landowners could amend the covenants; the amendment applied to existing landowners; and that notice was not required to obtain the votes necessary for the amendment.

The trial court boiled down the definitive issue to be determined as whether or not a “modification clause” in a subdivision’s restrictive covenants gives a purchaser of property notice that future changes may restrict his use of that property, as required by the second criteria used by courts in Ohio to assist them in analyzing whether an enforceable restriction has been created by a covenant.

The trial court (and the appellate court, upon appeal by the Meadows Plat landowners) held that the amendment to the 1989 Meadows Plat restrictions could not be enforced either in law or in equity, and declared the amendment to be void. The court reasoned that “the original restrictions did not mandate that only residential homes be constructed, the amendments added additional burdens to Grace Fellowship without notice,” and that Grace Fellowship purchased the property with reliance on the existing restrictions, which did not prohibit its intended use for the property.”

 The court of appeals bolstered its reasoning by first citing the general rule with respect to construing agreements limiting the use of real estate, which general rule provides that such agreements are to be strictly construed against limitations upon such use, and that all doubts should be resolved against a possible construction thereof which would increase the restriction upon the use of such real estate. Applying such general rule, the court emphasized that the initial (1989) restrictions used specific language that provided only “the covenants herein” could be modified. Those covenants deal with setbacks and building restrictions; not restrictions on use. 

The court of appeals also cited public policy arguments for voiding the Amendment. According to the court, “Applying amendments to existing landowners could completely alter a landowner’s ability to use his property for the purposes for which it was intended. This would be similar to a governmental taking by a private entity and is not an equitable policy. It is also noteworthy, for the purposes of comparison, that in cases dealing with the general application of zoning and usage requirements exercised by local governments, a reasonable policy of “grandfathering in” past owners and uses is applied.”

What is the moral of this story? Clearly, “watch your language with restrictive covenants”. These covenants are not favored by the courts and strictly construed. If the original restrictions in Grace stated that the land owners could (by majority vote) amend the initial restrictions, as well as enact additional restrictions such as limiting the parcels to residential use only, perhaps the result in Grace would have been different. On the other hand, when houses of worship or other “suspect uses” are involved, it seems that attempted “end arounds” can only work on the football field.