Showing posts with label Land Use Planning. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Land Use Planning. Show all posts

Zoning 101, Grandfathered Uses and Ohio Liquor Control Law vs. Municipal Zoning Ordinances

By Stephen D. Richman, Senior Counsel- Kohrman, Jackson & Krantz, PLL

When buying a particular piece of real estate, it is not enough to understand its physical and economic characteristics and constraints. The prospective buyer of realty must also make itself aware (prior to purchase), that there may be controls, or limits on how a particular property can be used. Land use is generally controlled and regulated through public controls (e.g., zoning laws) and private controls via deed restrictions. Generally, zoning ordinances are local laws regulating and controlling the use of land and buildings, within certain zones or districts. Typical zoning ordinances are those which regulate lot size, building heights, setbacks (i.e., minimum distances of structures from streets and other structures) and type of use allowed (e.g., residential, commercial, industrial or agricultural).

The potential real estate buyer can protect itself from zoning surprises by: 1) investigating zoning as part of its due diligence; 2) insisting on a contingency in the purchase agreement that its intended use be permitted under current zoning; and 3) purchasing a zoning endorsement as part of an owner’s title insurance policy. Otherwise, for example, the buyer of a one-half acre lot in Pepper Pike may discover that it cannot build a house on less than an acre; and a buyer of a warehouse building in an area of Mentor zoned “M-2” (manufacturing) may discover it cannot renovate same for a restaurant.

What if a prospective buyer does all of its required diligence and its use complies with zoning at the time of purchase, but a municipality’s zoning laws change after the purchase, rendering the use, now “nonconforming?” A nonconforming use is a use that was legal at the time it was created but which has since become disallowed because of a later modification or adoption of a zoning ordinance.

Generally, zoning ordinances and land use regulations are not supposed to be retroactive; they ordinarily apply only to new or modified uses of land. The Supreme Court of Ohio has held that land-use restrictions may not apply retroactively to prohibit the lawful use of real property, unless such use creates a nuisance affecting the public health, safety, morals or general welfare.  See City of Akron v. Chapman,116 N.E.2d 697(Ohio 1953). Accordingly, when a new zoning law restricts or outlaws existing uses that would otherwise be lawful, these nonconforming uses are “grandfathered” and “may be continued, although such use does not conform with the provisions of such ordinance or amendment…” See O.R.C. § 713.15.

However, this protection is not absolute. There are at least two significant limitations. First, if the use is abandoned, it may be lost. Second, most zoning ordinances provide that while nonconforming uses may continue in their present form and scope, they will not be allowed to expand.

In the recent case of Mentor v. Sines, 2015-Ohio-5546, neither party took issue with the general rule of “grandfathering.” Additionally, both parties agreed upon the theory that a non-conforming use may not be expanded. However, both sides disagreed as to whether or not the store owner’s (Sines’s) sale of alcoholic beverages was an unlawful expansion of the grandfathered use of retail sales (of gasoline, automotive and grocery products) in an area newly zoned residential, or just the addition of a different kind of carry out beverage to inventory.

The facts are as follows: Sines Inc. (“Sines” or “Appellant”) owns a gas station on Johnnycake Ridge Road in Mentor, Ohio. Appellant's station has service bays, a retail sales area, an office, two gas pumps and a second floor apartment. Sines has operated the station since the early 1960s, before the property became a part of the City of Mentor, and before the city enacted a zoning ordinance calling for residential use only in an area that includes the gas station. In 2002, Sines applied for but was denied a variance to enlarge the retail area of the station. In 2012, Sines applied for and was granted a permit (from the Ohio Division of Liquor Control) for the carryout sale of beer, wine and pre-mixed beverages. Mentor appealed the division's decision to the Ohio Liquor Control Commission, which affirmed the division's order. The city thereafter appealed the commission's order to the court of common pleas and that court reversed the commission's order, claiming that the sale of alcoholic beverages was an unlawful extension of Sines' non-conforming use (of a gas station with retail sales of gasoline, automotive and [non-alcoholic] grocery type products). Sines than appealed the trial court’s decision to the Tenth District Court of Appeals of Ohio.

Sines alleged that the sale of alcoholic beverages was not an unlawful extension of its existing, non-conforming use, but merely an extension of inventory; from milk and coke bottles, to milk, coke, beer and wine bottles.  Sines also contended that its “inventory vs. use expansion” would neither increase traffic, nor create any concern for the health, safety or welfare of the community.

Mentor argued that the sale of intoxicating beverages by Sines, pursuant to its Ohio liquor permits, constitutes an expanded use of the property, based on beverages already sold by Sines at that location,  and that the city’s ordinance precludes such an expansion of use. Pursuant to Section 1139.01(b) of the City of Mentor Ordinances, “a non-conforming use shall not be extended or enlarged after passage of this Zoning Code by … the addition of other uses, of a nature which would be prohibited generally in the district involved.” The city also argued that increased activity at the location would create safety concerns.

In arriving at its decision to overturn the trial court’s ruling, the 10th District Court of Appeals first looked to precedent (prior case law on point). Citing cases from the 12th, 2nd and 8th appellate districts, the court concluded: "[a]n increase in the volume of business alone does not constitute an unlawful extension of a nonconforming use where the nature of the land is virtually unchanged," (citing Hunziker v. Grande, 8 Ohio App.3d 87, 89 (8th Dist.1982) and that "Nonconforming use restrictions are meant to apply to the area of the use and not to inventory," (citing State ex rel. Zoning Inspector of Montgomery Cty. v. Honious, 20 Ohio App.2d 210, 212 (2d Dist.1969).

The court of appeals in Sines emphasized, however, that it did not need the benefit of precedent to decide the case, because they were dealing with the sale of  state controlled liquor sales, and in such matters they need only follow “clear instruction from the legislature in O.R.C. 4303.292. “
  
O.R.C. 4303.292 provides:

(A) The division of liquor control may refuse to issue, transfer the ownership of, or renew, and shall refuse to transfer the location of, any retail permit issued under this chapter if it finds * * *: (2) That the place for which the permit is sought: (a) does not conform to the building, safety, or health requirements of the governing body of the county or municipal corporation in which the place is located. As used in division (A)(2)(a) of this section, "building, safety, or health requirements" does not include local zoning ordinances…”

In other words, according to the court in Sines,“a municipality may not regulate the sale or use of alcoholic beverages at these operations in the guise of zoning.” Or, stated another way, state liquor control law trumps city municipal zoning law. Accordingly, the appellate court in Sines held that the common pleas court impermissibly used Mentor's zoning ordinance as a basis for reversal (of the granting of liquor permits), contrary to R.C. 4303.292(A)(2)(a).

So what is the moral of this story? If you are buying real property, understand and recognize that zoning laws limit use of property, and accordingly, make sure before you buy that your intended use is lawfully permitted. If you own property that is grandfathered, don’t abandon the grandfathered use, and understand that approval of expansion plans may result in an increase in size of your building, but (without consent of the municipality) may not increase the size of your nonconforming use.  Finally, don’t forget that local “grandfathering laws” may be subject to and usurped by the laws of a higher authority (i.e., state and federal governments).


County Land Banks in Ohio: Tackling Abandoned Property One Parcel At A Time

Here’s a scenario that’s all too common in cities across Ohio:  A structure, often a house in a struggling residential neighborhood, stands empty, abandoned by its titled owners and steadily deteriorating year by year. The lender could foreclose and take title to the property through a credit bid if there are no higher bidders at the sheriff’s sale. However, this often does not happen if the mortgaged property is in a blighted or other struggling neighborhood. The lender does not want to be stuck with the property.
 
A property can hang in this legal limbo indefinitely, dragging down a neighborhood by suppressing property values and attracting crime.
 
One option for combating this property is a land bank. A “land bank” is a nonprofit entity, often governmental, that is established primarily to take title or control of vacant or abandoned property, manage it and then dispose of the property.  As stated by the Western Reserve Land Conservancy, based in Cleveland, Ohio, “… land banks can safely hold a distressed property, clean its title and prepare it for a better day.”
 
According to Jessica de Wit, in her article for the University of Michigan/economic development titled Revitalizing Blighted Communities with Land Banks,

“When property owners neglect and abandon their properties, the local municipality must use its own resources to clean and maintain the properties as part of their nuisance abatement responsibilities to protect the public health, safety and welfare of its community. … Abandoned and vacant properties drive down the surrounding property values, which lowers the property taxes that most municipalities rely on as a primary source of revenue.

Property abandonment can destabilize a neighborhood by causing an out-migration of property owners, who are worried about losing value on their properties due to surrounding vacant and abandoned land. A Temple University study suggests that, all things being equal, the presence of an abandoned house on a block reduces the value of all the other property by an average of $6,720.”

There are quite a few land banks in the state of Ohio.  The Western Reserve Land Conservancy lists 24 Ohio county land banks on its web site. The first county land bank in Ohio was created in 2008 when legislation was passed in the state to allow the creation of a land bank in Cuyahoga County. The formation of 23 additional county land banks in the past 7 years is testimony to the growing need to deal with vacant blighted properties in the state.
 
There are those who believe a strong, all powerful government is the solution for all that ails us. On the other end of the spectrum of those who what no government led or backed solution to anything.  I tend to fall somewhere in the middle. While I don’t much care for a large, intrusive, over-regulating government at any level, there are some problems out there that cannot be solved without governmental, or quasi-governmental involvement. The problem of abandoned property in our urban areas is one of them. Land banks are one of the few options I’ve seen that can clear title so these properties can be put back into service and help our cities get back on their feet.
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Recent Real Estate Legislation Introduced in the Ohio Legislature



Recent bills of the 131st General Assembly  (See https://www.legislature.ohio.gov/) pending in the Ohio House and Ohio Senate related to real property are as follows:

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HB 134 - https://www.legislature.ohio.gov/legislation/legislation-status?id=GA131-HB-134

To amend sections 323.47, 1901.18, 1901.185, 2303.26, 2329.01, 2329.02, 2329.20, 2329.21, 2329.23, 2329.26, 2329.30, 2329.31, 2329.33, 2329.52, and 2909.07 and to enact sections 2308.01 to 2308.04, 2329.211, and 2329.311 of the Revised Code to establish summary actions to foreclose mortgages on vacant and abandoned residential properties and to make other changes relative to residential foreclosure actions. Status- Referred to Local Government Committee.


To amend sections 3745.13 and 4745.01 and to enact sections 3744.01, 3744.02, 3744.03, 3744.04, 3744.06, 3744.09, 3744.12, 3744.13, 3744.15, 3744.16, 3744.17, 3744.18, 3744.20, and 5302.31 of the Revised Code to provide for the remediation of real property on which an illegal methamphetamine manufacturing laboratory has been discovered. Status- Referred to Judiciary Committee.

HB 149 - https://www.legislature.ohio.gov/legislation/legislation-summary?id=GA131-HB-149

To amend sections 4112.02, 4112.05, 4112.08, and 4112.14 and to enact section 4112.024 of the Revised Code to make permissive actual damages and attorney's fees, to limit certain civil penalties, to allow respondents to recover attorney's fees in certain instances, and to exempt certain landlords from the housing provisions of the Ohio Civil Rights Law. Status- Referred to Financial Institutions, Housing, and Urban Development Committee.


To amend sections 1509.02, 1509.071, 1509.11, 1509.34, 1509.50, 1513.08, 1513.182, 1514.11, 5747.98, 5749.01, 5749.02, 5749.06, 5749.11, and 5751.01 and to enact sections 164.29, 190.01, 190.02, 190.03, 190.04, 190.05, 321.50, 321.51, 505.96, 1509.075, 3737.15, 3745.50, 5501.37, 5747.56, 5747.63, and 5749.18 of the Revised Code to change the basis, rates, and revenue distribution of the severance tax on oil and gas, to create a grant program to encourage compressed natural gas as a motor vehicle fuel, to authorize an income tax credit for landowners holding an oil or gas royalty interest, and to exclude some oil and gas sale receipts from the commercial activity tax base. Status- Referred to Ways and Means Committee.


To amend sections 715.72, 715.79, 715.80, 715.81, 715.82, 715.83, 5709.61, 5709.62, 5709.63, 5709.632, 5709.82, 5733.06, 5733.41, 5747.02, and 5747.41 and to repeal sections 715.73, 715.74, 715.75, 715.76, 715.761, 715.77, 715.771, and 715.78 of the Revised Code to revise the law governing the creation and operation of joint economic development districts (JEDDs) and enterprise zones. Status- Referred to Economic and Workforce Development Committee.


To amend sections 5311.18 and 5312.12 of the Revised Code to provide that a portion of a condominium or planned community assessment is prior to other liens on condominium units and planned community lots and to provide that a condominium unit owner’s association lien is a continuing lien. Status- Referred to Commerce and Labor Committee.


To amend section 5715.19 of the Revised Code to require counties, municipal corporations, townships, and school boards that file complaints against the valuation of property they do not own to pass a resolution approving the complaint and specifying the compensation paid to any person retained to represent the county, municipal corporation, township, or school board in the matter of the complaint. Status- Referred to Local Government Committee.


To amend sections 133.04, 133.06, 709.024, 709.19, 3317.021, 5501.311, 5709.12, 5709.82, 5709.83, 5709.831, 5709.832, 5709.85, 5709.91, 5709.911, 5709.913, and 5715.27 and to enact sections 1710.14, 1724.12, 5709.45, 5709.46, and 5709.47 of the Revised Code to authorize municipal corporations to create downtown redevelopment districts and innovation districts for the purposes of promoting the rehabilitation of historic buildings, creating jobs, encouraging economic development in commercial and mixed-use areas, and supporting grants and loans to technology-oriented and other businesses. Status- Referred to Government Accountability and Oversight Committee.


To amend section 5120.092 and to enact section 5120.80 of the Revised Code to allow the Director of Budget and Management to transfer funds from the Adult and Juvenile Correctional Facilities Bond Retirement Fund to any fund created in the state treasury administered by the Department of Rehabilitation and Correction or the Department of Youth Services, to create the Community Programs Fund, and to authorize the conveyance of state-owned real property. Status- Referred to House Government and Accountability Committee.

HB-273 – https://www.legislature.ohio.gov/legislation/legislation-summary?id=GA131-HB-273

To amend sections 1923.12, 1923.13, and 1923.14 and to enact section 4781.56 of the Revised Code regarding the removal of abandoned or unoccupied manufactured homes, mobile homes, or recreational vehicles from manufactured home parks. Status- Legislation introduced.



To amend section 2323.13 of the Revised Code to require notice and an opportunity for a hearing to a defendant before entry of judgment pursuant to a confession of judgment. Status- Legislation introduced.


To amend sections 307.699, 3735.67, 5715.19, 5715.27, and 5717.01 of the Revised Code to limit the right to initiate most types of property tax complaints to the property owner and the county recorder of the county in which the property is located. “The board of county commissioners, the prosecuting attorney or treasurer of the county, the board of township trustees of any township with territory within the county, the board of education of any school district with any territory in the county, or the mayor or legislative authority of any municipal corporation with any territory in the county may file such a complaint only as a counterclaim to a complaint filed by the property owner, the property owner's spouse, or an individual retained by the property owner or the property owner's spouse who is authorized to file a complaint under this section.” Status- Referred to Ways and Means Committee.

SB 96 - https://www.legislature.ohio.gov/legislation/legislation-summary?id=GA131-SB-96

To amend section 5715.39 of the Revised Code to waive any penalty due with respect to unpaid property taxes resulting when a mortgage lender fails to notify the county auditor of a satisfied mortgage. Status- Referred to State and Local Government Committee.

SB 201- https://www.legislature.ohio.gov/legislation/legislation-summary?id=GA131-SB-201

To amend section 3767.01 of the Revised Code to expand nuisance law to apply to any real property, including vacant land, on which an offense of violence has occurred or is occurring. Status- Legislation introduced.



Remembering Kelo v. City of New London -- 10 Years Later

Last week marked the 10th anniversary of the US Supreme Court’s 5-4 decision known as Kelo v. City of New London.  In that decision the Supreme Court ruled private economic development is a public use under the 5th amendment to the US Constitution. This decision allows governments at all levels to take people’s private property, including their homes, businesses and farms, and hand that property over to another private party to develop in a way more the that government’s liking with the expectation it will raise more tax revenue or create jobs.

Public reaction against the decision was strong.  I’m letting my own personal opinion show through here, but this cavalier approach to eminent domain shows a tremendous disrespect by governments for its citizens and their property and livelihood, combined with a bit of economic elitism.  This is exacerbated by the need for governmental agencies to obtain a valuation of the property that works within their limited tax dollars.  All around it leads to private citizens losing their property for objectionable reasons and receiving compensation that’s often on the low end of its fair value. If a small business is involved, the compensation for moving that business to a new location is frequently inadequate.

In the first 5 years after Kelo, approximately 43 states passed some level of reform to curb at least the excesses of eminent domain unleashed by Supreme Court’s decision.  Here in Ohio, the Ohio Supreme Court in 2006 issued its decision in City of Norwood v. Horney (110 Ohio St.3d 353) which essentially reversed the application of Kelo in the state of Ohio, and held that economic development, in and of itself, does not satisfy the public use requirement of the Ohio Constitution.

In 2007, Ohio’s legislature passed S.B. 7, which amended Ohio’s eminent domain law. S.B. 7 provided a comprehensive definition of ‘blight’ that narrowed its application and curbed some of the worst abuses of blight studies employed by some local governments.

S.B. 7 also put into place new pre-appropriation requirements and procedures for appropriation proceedings, and provided for additional compensation to landowners, along with provides for their costs and potentially attorney fee awards.

While many property rights groups and others feel that Ohio’s amendments to its eminent domain law were insufficient, these changes, when combined with the Norwood decision, constitute progress in the right direction.

As for the property taken by the City of New London, Connecticut as a result of the Kelo decision, what happened to it?  The houses were torn down except for Ms. Kelo’s house, which was moved at private expense. The land remains vacant and undeveloped, occupied only by some feral cats. The original development plan that triggered the eminent domain action and lawsuit was poorly planned and feel apart. After 10 years, there is finally some development planned for the condemned property--a park is planned for the parcel that was Ms. Kelo’s house.
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Watch Your Language with Restrictive Covenants

(“Say what you mean, precisely, or a judge will decide what you meant” #8)



As established in other “Watch Your Language” articles for this Blog, as a general rule, courts will uphold language in commercial agreements, unless it is contrary to statutory law or public policy. Because of this judicial deference to “commercial language”, you must say what you mean, precisely, or a judge will decide what you meant. Saying what you mean, precisely, is even more important in the context of negative covenants that limit the uses that can be made by the owner or occupier of land (aka restrictive covenants).

Why? Because it is well-established that restrictive covenants on the use of property are generally viewed with disfavor in Ohio courts and in other jurisdictions. The free use of land and property rights has occupied an important part of our history, and is rooted in the Constitution. Nonetheless, courts still enforce restrictions when they are clearly and unambiguously used in covenants (unless contrary to law or public policy).  Certainly, restrictive covenants constituting unlawful discrimination in Ohio (and elsewhere) are held to be void (See ORC Section 5309.281) and restrictions on the type of use (e.g. residential, commercial…) are usually upheld. It is between these two extremes where it gets difficult to predict. As a guide, there are five criteria used by courts in Ohio to assist them in analyzing whether an enforceable restriction has been created by a covenant.

First, the restrictions “must be a part of the general subdivision plan and applicable to all lots.” Second, “lot purchasers must be given adequate notice of the restriction.” Third, the restrictions must be in accord with law and public policy. Fourth, the restriction “cannot be implied, but must be express.” Finally, the restriction must “run with the land and, as a result, be inserted in the form of a covenant in the owner’s chain of title.”

What about an amendment to existing restrictions which amendment prevents a landowner from using the property for the purposes for which it was originally purchased? This was the issue before the court in Grace Fellowship Church, Inc. v. Harned, 2013-Ohio-5852(11th Dist. Ct. of App., Trumbull Cty.).


The basic facts of the case are as follows: In 1989, owners of a tract of land recorded “Restrictions Covering All Lots and Parcels of Land in the Meadows Plat, Vienna Township.” These 1989 restrictive covenants established required set-back lines, size of dwellings, construction restrictions, and limitations on items that may be placed or parked on the land. The 1989 restrictions also contained the following language re: effective dates and modification procedures: “The covenants herein shall be construed as covenants running with the land, and shall remain in effect until January 1, 1999, and thereafter, unless and except modified or changed by a vote of 51% or more, of the lot or acreage owners…” In March of 2011, Grace Fellowship purchased land located at Lot 13 in the Meadows Plat. Grace Fellowship also purchased 70 acres of land adjacent to the Meadows Plat. 

Grace Fellowship intended to build a church on the newly purchased land and to construct a driveway or access road upon Lot 13. Grace Fellowship’s plans did not violate the 1989 restrictive covenants. In December of 2011, a majority of the owners in the Meadows Plat signed a document attempting to amend the 1989 restrictive covenants. The amendment created additional restrictions on the usage of the property in the Meadows Plat, providing that: “All lots or acreage contained in the original Meadows Plat shall be used solely for single family residential purposes. No lot or acreage contained therein shall be used for or contain a road, highway, alleyway, driveway, passageway, thoroughfare, avenue, street, route, parkway, byway, trail, lane, path, or parking lot…” By virtue of the 2011 Amendment, Grace Fellowship would not be able to use Lot 13 for a road, and accordingly, it would not be able to operate its church on the adjoining 70 acres. In 2012, Grace Fellowship filed a Complaint for Declaratory Judgment and Other Relief against the owners of the lots located in the Meadows Plat. Grace Fellowship argued that the restrictive covenants had expired on January 1, 1999, and that the 2011 amendment violated Ohio’s Marketable Title Act because it allowed an increased burden to the property upon the amendment of the restrictive covenants. It also argued that the amendment violated its religious freedom, disallowed the church to have ingress and egress across the property, and that a proper vote was not held to modify the covenants.

The Meadows Plat landowners argued that the 1989 covenants had not expired; the landowners could amend the covenants; the amendment applied to existing landowners; and that notice was not required to obtain the votes necessary for the amendment.

The trial court boiled down the definitive issue to be determined as whether or not a “modification clause” in a subdivision’s restrictive covenants gives a purchaser of property notice that future changes may restrict his use of that property, as required by the second criteria used by courts in Ohio to assist them in analyzing whether an enforceable restriction has been created by a covenant.

The trial court (and the appellate court, upon appeal by the Meadows Plat landowners) held that the amendment to the 1989 Meadows Plat restrictions could not be enforced either in law or in equity, and declared the amendment to be void. The court reasoned that “the original restrictions did not mandate that only residential homes be constructed, the amendments added additional burdens to Grace Fellowship without notice,” and that Grace Fellowship purchased the property with reliance on the existing restrictions, which did not prohibit its intended use for the property.”

 The court of appeals bolstered its reasoning by first citing the general rule with respect to construing agreements limiting the use of real estate, which general rule provides that such agreements are to be strictly construed against limitations upon such use, and that all doubts should be resolved against a possible construction thereof which would increase the restriction upon the use of such real estate. Applying such general rule, the court emphasized that the initial (1989) restrictions used specific language that provided only “the covenants herein” could be modified. Those covenants deal with setbacks and building restrictions; not restrictions on use. 

The court of appeals also cited public policy arguments for voiding the Amendment. According to the court, “Applying amendments to existing landowners could completely alter a landowner’s ability to use his property for the purposes for which it was intended. This would be similar to a governmental taking by a private entity and is not an equitable policy. It is also noteworthy, for the purposes of comparison, that in cases dealing with the general application of zoning and usage requirements exercised by local governments, a reasonable policy of “grandfathering in” past owners and uses is applied.”

What is the moral of this story? Clearly, “watch your language with restrictive covenants”. These covenants are not favored by the courts and strictly construed. If the original restrictions in Grace stated that the land owners could (by majority vote) amend the initial restrictions, as well as enact additional restrictions such as limiting the parcels to residential use only, perhaps the result in Grace would have been different. On the other hand, when houses of worship or other “suspect uses” are involved, it seems that attempted “end arounds” can only work on the football field.


CLE Updates: Upcoming Real Estate Educational Seminars

In one sign that spring is here, the number of educational seminars on real estate topics is blooming.  Below is information regarding several upcoming seminars:
1.  The Ohio State Bar Association (OSBA) is sponsoring a Land Use and Zoning seminar on Wednesday, May 21, 2014 in Cleveland- live- (The Ritz Carlton, 1515 W. 3rd St., 44113) and in Columbus--live and via webcast on Wednesday May 14, 2014 (OSBA offices, 1700 Lake Shore Drive, 43204). Click here to access the OSBA's seminars.

2.  Sterling Education Services (SES) is sponsoring a seminar titled "Landlord-Tenant Law" on Friday, April 25, 2014 in Akron, Ohio (Holiday Inn Akron West, 4073 Medina Road; 330-666-4131).  Log on to www.sterlingeducation.com or call 715-835-5132 to register.

3.  National Business Institute (NBI) is sponsoring a seminar titled "Road and Easement Law from A to Z" on Monday, June 2, 2014 in Cleveland (Holiday Inn Independence, 6001 Rockside Road) . Order Now via the Web or Call: 800-930-6182.



+ Don’t Forget

4. Early-bird OSBA Convention registration discount extended to April 18
Register today and save $50 off full or $25 off single day registration.
The OSBA Annual Convention, April 30-May 2, at the Hyatt Regency Hotel in Columbus, continues to be one of the best CLE values available to Ohio lawyers.
In addition to being a great value, they have planned many new and exciting features for the 2014 Convention, including:
  • Special programming to celebrate and honor our military veterans for their service to our country;
  • A larger selection of CLE courses: 51 sessions, organized into 5 different tracks;
  • Shorter 60-90 minute CLE sessions;
  • Comprehensive programming designed specifically for the general practitioner; and
  • Sunrise and sunset CLE options to maximize your time at Convention.
Offer expires April 18. Log on to www.ohiobar.org/convention, or call their member service center at (800) 232-7124.
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Revitalizing the Rust Belt--Cleaning Up Contaminated Land is a Risky and Expensive Proposition


A great deal of formerly industrial land in the US now sits vacant and unused, adding to the ugliness and depressed feel of many cities, large and small.  The problem has been how to redevelop the land, and clean up any potential contamination in the process.  Developers and other potential buyers of the property as understandably reluctant to acquire and redevelop the land because the exposure to liability and the enormous amount of governmental red tape involved in cleaning up a property makes redevelopment too expensive of a proposition. As a result, the property just sits, further decaying.

Government at all levels has tried to combat this problem to encourage redevelopment of the land but it often results in more red tape and too little progress.  Typically, the safe harbors provided in the law are designed to work in specific situations and with ownership structures. When situations arise that don't exactly fit the parameters of the safe harbors, there often is no leeway in the law that enable the government agency to effectively deal with it. 

There are also grant programs in place to help cover the costs of clean up.  However, in today's economy, tax dollars are scarce and there are not sufficient funds available to clean up all the contaminated properties that are out there. Further, there exists an alphabet soup of departments, bureaus and agencies at all levels of governments with overlapping authority and competing rules and regulations, and a developer must somehow accommodate them all at great cost and potential risk.

At the US EPA, cleanup of contaminated land might involve Brownfield regulation, removal of above-the-ground or underground storage tanks, Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) corrective action, and Superfund issues.  Click here to access the EPA web page for regulatory information on Land and Clean Up. In Ohio, you may also need to deal with the Ohio EPA's Division of Environmental Response and Revitalization.

In regulatory guidance issued by the US EPA late last year, the use of institutional controls such as deed restrictions, easements, zoning restrictions and other such mechanisms that would help ensure that the uses of reclaimed contaminated land is limited to those purposes that are safe. For example, certain real property may be cleaned up sufficiently to be safe for commercial use, but would remain unsuitable for single family homes. Deed or zoning restrictions can be useful in this situation to ensure that the land is not converted to more ill-advised uses in the future.

There is a trend in environmental regulations and policy guidelines at the federal or state level to encourage a higher level of public and governmental involvement in this process. Obtaining input and buy-in from the local populace and assistance from governmental regulators with knowledge and expertise in the issue seems like a decent idea in theory. But let's never forget the old but true axiom of the road to Hell being paved with good intentions.  The result, in practice, is often just another layer of complications and obstacles that result in greater risk, expense and delay ending with a failed project that never gets completed.

How about providing instead, a streamlined permitting and regulatory process with fewer agencies to navigate, and which encourages developers to take on the clean up with more manageable expenses and exposure to risk? Our grant programs for clean up are not bottomless pits of funds and with a streamlined bureaucratic process along with liability protections within a clearly defined safe harbor, developers might be more inclined to revitalize the real property on their own dime.
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A Victory for Property Rights

The Supreme Court delivered a victory for property rights in June with its decision in Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Management issued on June 25, 2013.  The case addressed whether a Florida wetlands district can place excessive conditions on its approval of a land use permit.  Sadly, the circumstances at the basis of this case started back in 1994 and are only now being finally resolved. 

Mr. Koontz is a landowner in Florida who wanted to approximately 15 acres of property that was classified as wetlands. Mr. Koontz wanted to develop 3.7 acres of the land and was willing to deed the other 11 acres to the water management district  for conservation. Sounds like a pretty good deal for the district with 2/3 of the land going for conservation and only 1/3 being developed.

The district refused, wanting all but one acre of Mr. Koontz's land, or in the alternative, allowing him to proceed with the 3.7 acre development, deeding the conservation easement on the 11 acres PLUS paying thousands more to improve some other district land that had nothing to do with his proposed development.

Mr. Koontz refused and sued the district, alleging that its unreasonable exercise of state power was a taking of his property without just compensation. The Florida courts disagreed using some rather upside down logic that since Mr. Koontz was refused the permit, his land wasn't actually taken and therefore he didn't have a claim.

The US Supreme Court disagreed with the Florida court, holding that
"extortionate demands for property in the land-use context run afoul of the Takings Clause not because they take property but because they impermissibly burden the right not to have property taken without just compensation."


This decision is significant as the government at all levels can be rather creative in finding more ways to extort property from landowners.  However, I'm troubled that the decision was only 5-4. We are only one Supreme Court justice away from the government being able to further burden with impunity people's ability to use their own land.
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Creating and Terminating Public Rights-of-Way

The following article was prepared by John Murray, an associate attorney at Kohrman Jackson & Krantz P.L.L.:


If you are a landowner or prospective landowner, the presence of a public right-of-way on your land can have a significant impact on your rights and obligations in your property. In particular, rights-of-way can be a nuisance to a developer seeking to remove encumbrances on his or her land to make way for strategic developments. Consequently, it is important to understand how public rights-of-way are created and removed.


I. How is a Public Right-of-Way Created?

A public “right-of-way” is a portion of land dedicated to the public, such as a street, a highway, or an alley, for the purpose of allowing the public to pass through private property. Public rights-of-way can be created by following a formal procedure established by a municipality, county, or other local government. Alternatively, they may be created by a court’s determination that the public’s continual use of a portion of land coupled with the landowner’s intent that the portion be used by the public created a public right-of-way.

The formal process of dedicating land varies by each local government, but generally requires an official transfer of the portion of land to be used as the right-of-way in a deed or plat recorded and accepted by the local government. Failure to follow the specific process will result in a failed dedication. However, even if the formal process is not correctly followed, a landowner’s attempt to follow the procedures can demonstrate intent to dedicate a right-of way, and if the right-of-way is actually used by the public, a court may find that by common-law (i.e. a court order) a public-right of way has been created.

II. Once a Public Right-of-Way is Created, How Can It be Removed?

There are only two ways in which a dedicated right-of-way can lose its “public property” status: (1) vacation, and (2) abandonment. Similar to dedication, vacation is a formal process whereby the local government or a court declares a right-of-way vacated (i.e. removed). Once vacation proceedings have started, the vacation is not complete until a new plat is prepared and recorded in the office of the county recorder where the land is located showing that the right-of-way has been vacated.

Abandonment of a right-of-way is exactly what it sounds like. The municipality, county, or township stops using the right-of-way for its intended public purpose for an extended period of time. It must be noted that removing a public right-of-way through abandonment is a very uncertain process that is available only through court proceedings, and can often consume valuable time and resources. If a landowner wishes to remove a right-of-way, it is always best to follow the formal vacation procedures before turning to the principles of abandonment.

Ohio law will not apply the abandonment principles to remove a right-of-way unless evidence shows that the public stopped using the right-of-way for at least twenty-one years. But extended non-use alone is not enough to constitute abandonment. An additional element must exist for abandonment to have full vacating effect: the municipality must intend to abandon the right-of-way. Intent can be shown through statements made by local government representatives or other deliberate actions showing a desire to give up the right-of-way. In the 2001 case of Duggan v. Village of Put-In-Bay, an Ohio appellate court found that the Village of Put-In-Bay had abandoned an alley that cut across the private property of local business owners when the village failed to exercise any dominion over the alley since its formal dedication in 1925 (well exceeding the twenty-one year time limit). Evidence of intent to abandon the alley was found when, years earlier, the village entered into a dispute with a local historical society over the land in question and the village Mayor stated that the village should not be responsible for maintaining the alley because it never exercised control over the alley and the alley was not important to them.

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The presence of a right-of-way on your land can impact your rights and obligations as a landowner. By understanding how public rights-of-way are created and terminated, a savvy landowner or developer in purchasing, selling, or developing real estate can better evaluate his or her options.
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Zoning Board’s Interpretation of “Ambiguous” Zoning Ordinance Trumps Interpretation of Court of Common Pleas

Lately, it seems that there are more and more decisions adversely affecting a municipality’s rights in terms of eroding “Home Rule” and other adverse judgments.

Today, (actually, October 4, 2012) score one for municipalities (and administrative agencies) with the Eighth District (Cuyahoga County) Court of Appeals decision: Cleveland Clinic Foundation, Et. Al. vs. Board of Zoning Appeals, City of Cleveland, 2012-Ohio-4602.

In the Cleveland Clinic case, Fairview Hospital (a hospital facility within the Cleveland Clinic Foundation system) sought to install a helipad adjacent to its hospital building. The City of Cleveland’s Zoning Administrator denied a permit for the helipad and the Clinic appealed to the City’s Board of Zoning Appeals (“BZA”). The BZA determined that a helipad was not a permitted accessory use in a “Local Retail Business District” and upheld the Zoning Administrator’s denial of the Permit. The BZA relied on City of Cleveland Ordinance 343.01(b)(8) which permits accessory uses in the business district, but provides that they must be “normally required for the daily local retail business needs of the resident locality only”. Since a “life flight” helicopter using a helipad could bring in injured persons from outside the locality, the BZA concluded that a helipad was not “an accessory use as of right in a Local Retail Business District”.

The Clinic then filed an administrative appeal with the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas (“Common Pleas Court”) who reversed the BZA’s decision, concluding that a helipad was a permitted accessory use in a Local Retail Business District. The Common Pleas Court used a different sub-section of the City ordinance to justify its reversal; namely City of Cleveland Ordinance 343.01(b)(1). Under C.C.O. 343.01(b)(1), “all uses permitted in the City’s Multi-Family District…are permitted uses in the Local Retail Business District”, and hospitals are included in the list of permitted uses (as accessory uses to the City’s Multi-Family District by virtue of C.C.O. 337.08). Interweaving custom with the plain language of C.C.O. 343.01(b)(1), the Common Pleas Court determined that since a helipad is “customarily incident to” a hospital, a helipad would be a permitted accessory use in a Local Retail Business District.

The BZA then appealed the Common Pleas Court decision to the Eighth District Court of Appeals (the “Court of Appeals”) who reversed the same, upholding the BZA’ s findings (and the Zoning Administrator’s denial of a permit for the helipad).

To help reach its decision, the Court of Appeals analyzed precedent, establishing, basically that a “court cannot blatantly substitute its judgment for that of an administrative agency, especially in areas of administrative expertise (See Dudukovich v. Lorain Metro Hous. Auth., 58 Ohio St. 2d 202, 207 [1979]). Later Ohio Supreme Court decisions similarly held that “when an agency is charged with the task of interpreting its own statute, courts must give due deference to those interpretations, as the agency has ‘accumulated substantial expertise’ and has been ‘delegated [with] enforcement responsibility’”(See Luscre-Miles v. Ohio Dept. of Edn., 2008 -Ohio-6781; Shell v. Ohio Veterinary Med. Licensing Bd., 2005-Ohio-2423). Even the United States Supreme Court has ruled that interpretive deference goes to the administrative agency vs. the judge “if the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue” and a statute is ambiguous if the language is susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation. (See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resource Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984)). 

Clearly, the Court of Appeals in the Cleveland Clinic case was faced with two interpretations, so it deemed the language of the zoning ordinance ambiguous, and because the ordinance was deemed ambiguous, it held that the Common Pleas Court was required, as a matter of law, to give due deference to the BZA’s interpretation of the ordinance, and since it failed to do so, it abused its discretion (governed by Ohio Revised Code Section 2506.01) when it reversed the BZA’s decision.

The Court of Appeals did note that the Clinic could petition for an amendment to the zoning code, deferring itself to the legislature stating that “the legislative branch is in the best position to weigh the competing interests at stake in drafting zoning laws for the city”. The founding fathers would be proud; the concept of “checks and balances” worked well in Cleveland Clinic Foundation, Et. Al. vs. Board of Zoning Appeals, City of Cleveland.





Ohio Supreme Court Rules that Next Door Neighbor in Next Door Town has Standing to Challenge the Constitutionality of the Neighboring Town’s Re-Zoning

Moore v. Middletown, Slip Opinion No. 2012-Ohio -3897

For those paying close attention to the articles in this Blog, you may recall my March 12, 2012 post entitled “Ohio Supreme Court Rules Next Door Neighbor in Next Door Town Lacks Standing to Pursue Regulatory Taking Claim.” Did the Ohio Supreme Court reverse itself in Moore v. Middletown? The short answer is no; instead, it took the opening it left itself in Clifton v. Blanchester, 131 Ohio St. 3d, 287, 2012-Ohio-780. The long answer is as follows:

In Clifton, 23 acres of land were annexed by the Village of Blanchester and then rezoned for industrial use, leaving the adjoining 97 acre farm owner in the adjacent city unhappy and claiming an adverse economic effect on his land. The court in Clifton concluded that “aside from acquiring property to operate a public utility that serves its own residents, a municipality has no authority to exercise its eminent domain powers beyond its corporate limits”. Therefore, the Village of Blanchester had no authority to “take” Mr. Clifton’s land, and accordingly, the next door neighbor (Mr. Clifton) from the next door town (Clinton County) did not have standing to initiate a claim for compensation based on a regulatory taking.

The court in Clifton, however, left its door open for future claims of standing by stating “we emphasize that we do not hold that an adjoining property owner may never have standing. Instead, we hold that a property owner lacks standing under the facts and circumstances presented here”.

Moore v. Middletown presents similar facts to the Clifton case. The Moore case arose from two ordinances enacted by the Middletown City Council. The first of those ordinances rezoned a 157 acre parcel of land from low density residential to general industrial use. The second ordinance amended a setback provision that previously required all industrial activities to be at least 600 feet from a property line. The Moores, like the Cliftons, owned adjacent property that was in an adjoining town. The Moores claimed that the rezoning was not for the benefit of the public but for the private benefit of the city’s largest employer, AK Steel Corporation (to allow for an industrial plant that would convert coal into coke for its steelmaking).

Moore brought suit against the city based on two different kinds of relief. Moore first asked that Middletown be ordered to appropriate Moore’s land and compensate the Moores for loss of value that they expected as a result of the rezoning. The second type of relief requested was a judgment calling for the rezoning ordinances to be held unconstitutional under the due process and equal protection clauses of the Ohio and U.S. Constitution. It is this two pronged approach in Moore that separates the two cases. Mr. Clifton did not challenge the constitutionality of the City of Blanchester’s rezoing.

The Court in Moore, consistent with its decision in Clifton, struck down the appropriation claim on the same basis that it struck down the Clifton claim. The court in Moore, however (overruling the 12th District Court of Appeals) held that the plaintiff does have standing to assert constitutional due process and equal protection claims. Citing U.S. Supreme Court decisions, the court in Moore summarized that to succeed in establishing standing for constitutional claims, plaintiffs must need only show that they 1) suffered an injury, 2) that the injury is fairly traceable to the defendant’s allegedly unlawful conduct, and 3) that the injury is likely to be redressed by the requested relief sought.

Justifying its decision, the court in Moore reminds us that Ohio expressly incorporated individual property rights into the Ohio Constitution in terms that re-enforced the important nature of an individual’s “inalienable” property rights, which ought to be held forever, “inviolate” (Ohio Constitution §19, Article 1). Since zoning ordinances can directly affect and often limit property rights, the court in Moore reasoned that property owners in Ohio (even neighboring landowners of the municipality that enacted the zoning) have the right to bring cases testing the constitutionality of zoning ordinances, including claims that the government action is arbitrary and unreasonable and bears no substantial relation to public health or safety.

The court in Moore also cautions us that the overall resolution of the case is far from over. In that regard, the Court stated: “the question before us in this appeal is whether they have a standing to do so, not whether they will succeed in their efforts”. Accordingly, the case was remanded to the trial court to determine the constitutionality of the municipality’s rezoning.

For those wondering why their attorneys draft fifty (50) page “briefs” and complaints to include multiple causes of action and alternative theories of recovery, Moore v. Middletown provides the answer. “Throwing everything at them and hoping something sticks” can be an effective strategy, especially when dealing with constitutional issues. It seems that Mr. Moore and his attorney have an uphill battle to have the rezoning declared unconstitutional, but at least their day in court continues. Stay tuned.

CLE Update: ALI ABA Land Use Institute



The American Law Institute - American Bar Association is sponsoring the Land Use Institute: Planning, Regulation, Litigation, Eminent Domain, and Compensation on Wednesday through Friday, August 8-10, 2012.  The institute is cosponsored by the Center for Urban Redevelopment Education (CURE), Florida Atlantic University.  The institute program will be held in Chicago, Illinois at the Millennium Knickerbocker Hotel.

Click here for more information or phone 1-800-CLE NEWS.
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